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In this paper, the s y n c h r o n y a s s u m p t i o n is relaxed. A new partially s y n c h r o n o u s timing m o d e l is described. D e v e l o p e d for this m o d e l is a new n o n b l o c k i n g r a n d o mized t r a n s a c t i o n c o m m i t protocol, which i n c o r p o r a t e s an agreement p r o t o c o l of Ben-Or. The new p r o t o c o l
works as long as fewer t h a n half the processors fail. A m a t c h i n g lower b o u n d is proved, showing that the n u m b e r of processor faults tolerated is optimal. If half or m o r e of the processors fail, the p r o t o c o l degrades gracefully: it blocks, but no processor p r o d u c e s a w r o n g answer. A n o t i o n of a s y n c h r o n o u s r o u n d is defined, and the p r o t o c o l is shown to terminate in a small c o n s t a n t expected n u m b e r of a s y n c h r o n o u s rounds. In c o n t r a s t it is shown that no p r o t o c o l in this m o d e l can g u a r a n t e e that a processor terminates in a b o u n d e d expected n u m b e r of its own steps, even if processors are synchronous.
Introduction
In a distributed d a t a b a s e system a t r a n s a c t i o n m a y be processed concurrently by several different processors. To m a i n t a i n the integrity of the d a t a b a s e these processors must take consistent action regarding the transaction either the results of the t r a n s a c t i o n should be installed in the d a t a b a s e at all processors (the t r a n s a c t i o n is committed), or the results should be installed at no processor (the t r a n s a c t i o n is aborted). The objective of a transaction commit protocol is to ensure that consistent action is taken and that as many transactions as practicable are committed. The protocol is subject to the constraint that each processor must be able to abort a transaction unilaterally (i.e., if any processor wishes to abort, the decision must be abort).
The definition of the transaction commit problem allows some leeway in protocol design regarding which circumstances require the decision to be commit. To avoid useless protocols that abort all transactions, it is usual to impose the additional requirement that a protocol must commit a transaction in any failure-free execution in which all processors vote commit. In this paper, we demonstrate the benefit of relaxing that requirement slightly.
Another variation among protocols is that some may fail to terminate in certain situations. If failures cause some nonfaulty processor to remain undecided about the fate of a transaction (at least as long as the failures persist), that processor is said to block, and the protocol is called blocking. Otherwise, the protocol is nonblocking.
The most common transaction commit protocol in practice, two-phase commit, is a blocking protocol. In the presence of processor failures, a blocking protocol can delay transaction processing for a long time, although it does allow correct action to be taken after the failure is repaired. The impact of processor failures is somewhat less with a nonblocking protocol.
Elegant nonblocking transaction commit protocols have been developed for completely synchronous systems by Skeen [12] and Dwork and Skeen [6] . An obstacle to using these protocols in real systems is that a single violation of the timing assumptions (i.e., a late message) can cause the protocol to fail, producing the wrong answer. The most common alternative timing model, the completely asynchronous model, unfortunately does not allow any solution to the transaction commit problem, either randomized or deterministic ~. We describe a new timing model that is intermediate between the synchronous and asynchronous models previously studied. In this model, we develop a new nonblocking transaction commit protocol.
We model real systems in which messages are usually delivered within some known time bound, but sometimes come late. Our approach is to assume a completely asynchronous system, in which relative processor speeds are unbounded and messages can take arbitrarily long to 1 The outline of this impossibility result is the following. Suppose there is a protocol that works in an asynchronous system and guarantees that (1) nonfaulty processors eventually decide (with probability 1); (2) if the processors all begin with commit and there are no failures, then they all decide commit; and (3) if any processor begins with abort, then the nonfaulty processors decide abort. Consider a run in which all processors but p begin with commit and are nonfaulty, while p fails initially. Eventually, the rest of the processors must decide. Since p could have started with abort, the processors must decide abort. There is another run that looks identical up to the decision point to all the processors except p, in which p begins with commit, and all its messages are delayed until after the decision is made. In this run, the decision must be commit. All processors except p have the same view in the two runs but must reach different decisions, contradicting the assumed existence of the protocol arrive, and to let the timing behavior affect the correctness conditions for the transaction commit problem as follows. If every processor initially wants to commit the transaction, then the common decision must be to commit, provided no processors fail and all messages arrive within some known fixed time bound. If any processor initially wants to abort the transaction, then the common decision must be to abort, no matter what the timing and fault behavior of the system is. This problem definition takes advantage of the leeway allowed in specifying when processors must commit. Assuming that failures and late messages are relatively rare, the overall progress of the transaction processing system will not be impeded very much. (Dwork, Lynch, and Stockmeyer [5] make a similar division between properties that must always hold and properties that only need hold when the system is well-behaved. In most other respects our model differs from theirs.)
In contrast, Dwork and Skeen [-7 ] study the transaction commit problem in a completely asynchronous model in which processor failures are detectable, i.e., always announced in finite time. In this model, they are able to take advantage of the failure notification to design efficient nonblocking transaction commit protocols.
We assume that the faulty processors fail by crashing (i.e., stopping without warning). Our protocol works as long as more than half the processors are nonfaulty. The number of faults tolerated by our protocol is optimal, as shown by the matching lower bound that we prove. (The synchronous protocols of Skeen [12] and Dwork and Skeen [6] tolerate any number of processor faults.) An important property of our protocol is that it degrades gracefully: if the bound on the number of faulty processors is exceeded, the protocol simply fails to terminate instead of producing a wrong answer.
Our protocol uses a modified version of a solution to the agreement problem. The agreement problem and the transaction commit problem, although superficially similar, are different problems. In the agreement problem each processor begins with an initial value, 0 or 1, and decides on a final value. All nonfaulty processors' final values must be equal, and if all processors have the same initial value, then that value must be the final value. Thus if one processor begins with 0 and the rest with I, either 0 or 1 is an acceptable decision for the agreement problem, whereas in the transaction commit problem, the decision must be 0 (if 0 is identified with abort).
An important difference between the transaction commit problem and the agreement problem is that in the former, all processors that decide are required to agree, including processors that decide and subsequently fail. This strict agreement condition is imposed because we assume that failed processors will eventually recover. The hope is that processors that fail and subsequently recover can be reintegrated using a separate recovery protocol. Skeen's thesis [12] has an excellent discussion of recovery protocols. We do not discuss these protocols further in this paper. Although the definition of the agreement problem places no constraints on the decisions reached by faulty processors, some agreement protocols have the property that even decisions reached by faulty processors are correct. Our transaction commit protocol incorporates one such agreement protocol.
In our protocol, processors exchange some messages and then execute a modification of the asynchronous agreement protocol of Ben-Or [1] to decide the fate of the transaction. The preliminary message exchanges serve two purposes: first, the differences between the input-output relations for the transaction commit and agreement problems are resolved, and second, a number of identical random bits are distributed 2. These identical random bits are used in the agreement protocol to lower the expected running time from exponential to constant. There is a body of work dealing with attaining constant expected running time for the agreement problem (see for example Rabin [11] or Chor, Merritt, and Shmoys [3] ). Our technique does not solve this problem because of the following difference between the agreement and transaction commit problems. In our protocol, if the identical random bits are not distributed in a timely fashion, processors can unilaterally decide 0 (abort) and still satisfy the conditions of the transaction commit problem. Such an action is not an option for processors in an agreement protocol, because it could violate the condition that all processors decide 1 if they all start with 1.
Randomization is needed in our protocol because the well-known result of Fischer, Lynch, and Paterson [8] implies that no deterministic protocol is possible. In order to analyze a randomized protocol, we must define the adversary against which the protocol will work. Our notion of the adversary is inspired by Chor, Merritt, and Shmoys [3] . The adversary in our model chooses the order in which processors take steps, when each message will be delivered, and which processors fail and when (as long as fewer than half fail). It makes these decisions dynamically, during the execution of the protocol, using unlimited computational power. The adversary has available at any point in the execution all information about the hardware and software of the processors, and the pattern of communication up to that time, but it does not know the contents of the messages sent, nor the local states of processors, nor the processors' local random choices, unless that information is deducible from the pattern of communication. We will be careful to design our protocol so that it is not deducible.
We prove that in our model no transaction commit protocol can guarantee that each processor terminates in a bounded expected number of its own steps, even if processors are synchronous and only a single fault is to be tolerated. Consequently a new measure is needed to analyze the time performance of our protocol. One of the contributions of this paper is such a measure, which we call an asynchronous round. Our protocol terminates in a small constant expected number of asynchronous rounds. 2 We have not solved the global coin toss problem, however, because our protocol does not guarantee that the identical random bits are successfully distributed. Fortunately, the unique nature of the transaction commit problem allows us to design a protocol in which a processor only needs to consult these bits in those executions in which they have been successfully distributed Following an exposition of our formal model in Sect. 2 , we present and analyze our randomized transaction commit protocol in Sect. 3. Section 4 contains the lower bound proof showing that our protocol tolerates the maximal number of faulty processors. In Sect. 5 we show that no transaction commit protocol can guarantee that each processor terminates in a bounded expected number of its own steps, even if processors are synchronous and only a single fault is to be tolerated. Section 6 contains a summary.
Model
There are n processors that are to decide the fate of a particular transaction. (Our protocol assumes that n >_ 1; our lower bounds assume that n > 2, and are not true if n = 1.) Processors are modeled as state machines that communicate by sending messages. Messages can take arbitrarily long to arrive. Our protocol works even in a very weak model in which there is no bound on the relative frequency with which processors take steps and in which there is no atomic broadcast of messages. Our lower bounds are shown in the stronger model in which processors run in lockstep synchrony and possess atomic broadcast. In this section we present the weaker model. In Sects. 4 and 5 we indicate the necessary changes for the stronger model. Our model is similar to those of Fischer, Lynch, and Paterson [8] and Dolev, Dwork, and Stockmeyer [4] .
Throughout this paper, 1 is identified with "commit" and 0 with "abort."
Basic model
A raw message consists of some text, and the names of the sending and receiving processors. A message is an ordered pair (raw message, integer); the integer denotes the sending time, as will be explained later. The reason for distinguishing between messages and raw messages is that we do not wish to require timestamps on (raw) messages sent by processors, yet this information is useful in the exposition of the model for distinguishing multiple instances of the same raw message and determining message delays.
A processor is an infinite-state machine, together with a message buffer and a random number generator. The message buffer holds messages that have been sent to the processor but not yet received and is modeled as a set of messages. The random number generator supplies an infinite sequence of n-bit strings. Certain processor states are initial states, designated (id, initval), where id is a nonnegative integer and initval is either 0 or 1. The id element of an initial state is the processor's name, or identification number. The initval element is the processor's initial value. There is an integer in each processor's state, called its clock, which is 0 in all initial states. The state machine's transition function is applied to a state, an n-bit string, and a set of raw messages to produce another state and a set of raw messages containing at most one raw message per recipient. The transition function always increments clock by 1.
Described informally, a processor at each step computes a new state and a set of raw messages to send, based on its current state, the set of raw messages just received, and an n-bit string from its random number generator. The processor keeps track of how many steps it has taken with the clock variable.
A protocol is a set of n processors, with identification numbers 0 through n-1. A particular protocol is implicit in all the definitions in the remainder of Sect. 2.
A configuration C consists of n states, one for each processor, and n sets of messages, one for each proces- A schedule is a finite or infinite sequence of events. A finite schedule a = el e2... ek is applicable to configuration C if e~ is applicable to C, e 2 is applicable to el(C), etc. The resulting configuration is denoted a(C). An infinite schedule is applicable to C if every finite prefix of the schedule is applicable to C.
Given Ideally we would like a processor to decide in a constant expected number of its own steps. Unfortunately, as we prove in Sect. 5, this is impossible, even if processors run in lockstep synchrony and only a single fault is to be tolerated. Instead, we characterize the time performance of our protocol using the following definition. Given an infinite run, a processor is defined inductively to be in a particular asynchronous round (or round) as follows. Asynchronous round 1 for processor p consists of p's first K steps. Asynchronous round r, r> 1, for p begins with the first step that p takes after the end of p's round r-1. It ends with the first step in which p has satisfied all of the following three conditions: p has taken at least K steps in round r, p has received every guaranteed message that was sent by a processor q in q's round r-1, and in the remainder of the infinite run there are no steps in which p receives a message that was sent by a processor q in q's round r-1. (Note that the last two conditions make sure that no round lasts infinitely long due to p's waiting for a non-guaranteed message that never arrives.)
This definition uses two criteria for ending a round, the number of processor steps taken and the collection of messages received. These criteria seem natural in our timing model, in which processors can take actions depending on the receipt of messages, as well as on timeouts.
A processor cannot compute its current asynchronous round; the definition is for our use as ommiscient observers as we analyze protocols. We require a round to last at least K steps to prevent a round from collapsing to nothing if no messages are sent in the previous round. If processors take steps in round-robin order, and receive and send messages only at the beginning of a round, and if each message sent at the sender's i th step is received at the recipient's (i + K) th step (for all i), then this definition is essentially the same as the synchronous round definition of Dwork and Skeen [6] .
Safety conditions
The following definition restricts what must happen if a processor decides, but does not require any processor to decide. A protocol is a transaction commit protocol if for every admissible run R:
9 Agreement Condition: Every configuration has at most one decision value.
9 Abort Validity Condition: If the initial value of any processor is 0, then no configuration has decision value 1.
Commit Validity Condition: If the initial value of all
processors is 1 and R is failure-free and on-time, then no configuration has decision value 0.
Since these three conditions must hold for any admissible run, regardless of how many processors are faulty, our definition of transaction commit protocol incorporates the graceful degradation property: processors may block but will never produce the "wrong" answer.
The definitions in Subsect. 2.1 allow each processor to receive an unbounded number of messages at each step. This assumption is not essential to our work, but to exclude uninteresting protocols, we must require that each processor be able to receive at least n messages at each step. Otherwise, processors could swamp the message system, causing messages to become late, not because the message system misbehaves, but because the ability of the processors to handle all the incoming message traffic is inadequate 3. For instance, the protocol "cause the run to be not on-time by flooding the message system and then abort" is not of much practical interest.
Adversary
The adversary can be considered a scheduler: it decides which processor takes a step next and which messages are received. In the introduction we gave an informal description of the adversary. This subsection formalizes the notion.
The message pattern of finite run R = C 1 el ... eg Ck+ 1, where ei = (Pi, Mi, bi) for all 1 < i < k, is the sequence of triples (p~, El, P~)... (Pk, Eg, Pk), where Pi is the set of processors to which messages were sent by event e~, and Ei is a set of integers indexing the events in the run that sent the messages, M~, received in e~. The point of making this definition is to isolate the pattern of message sending and receiving while hiding the contents of the messages.
3 For an example of swamping, consider the following. Suppose each processor can send n messages per step but only receive n-1. Consider the protocol: At each step, broadcast a message; at step 1, decide 0. We now show that no infinite failure-free run is on-time.
Let R be an infinite failure-free run. After Kn(n 1)+n events, (Kn(n-1)+n)n messages have been sent, and at most (Kn(n-1)+n) (n--l) have been received. So there are at least Kn(n--1)+n outstanding messages. By the pigeonhole principle, some processor p has at least K(n 1)+1 outstanding messages (to be received). It will take p at least K + 1 steps to receive all those messages, by which time the run will no longer be on-time
An adversary is a function that takes a message pattern (Pl, El, PO... (Pk, Ek, Pk) and returns a processor p, that will take step k + 1, and a set of at most n messages sent during the first k events whose receipt is delayed until the k + 1 ~t event. This set of messages is represented by a set E of integers, l<_lEl<_n, such that for all i~E, p~Pi.
Let ff be the collection of all n-tuples of infinite sequences of n-bit strings. Each element of Y is an n-tuple (Xo, ..., X,-l), where for all p, xp models the sequence of random strings that could be returned by processor p's random number generator in p's steps in some infinite run.
A run is uniquely determined by an adversary A, an initial configuration I, and an element F of Y. Denote Suppose the run up to configuration Ci has been constructed. Let p and E be the result of A acting on the message pattern of run C~ el... Ci. Then e~ consists of the processor p, the messages sent to p in all the events indexed by E, and the next unused bit string in the sequence for p in F. Event e~ is applicable to C~ by the definition of an adversary. We define Ci+l to be ei(Ci). Since the adversary is a total function, run(A, I, F) is an infinite run, and thus at least one processor is nonfaulty.
If the adversary were not restricted in any way, it could cause all processors (but one) to fail or no messages to be delivered, and no protocol would be possible. We limit the power of the adversary in the following reasonable way. We define a t-admissible adversary, for 0 _< t _< n, to be an adversary such that for all initial configurations I and all F in if, run(A, I, F) is t-admissible.
For predicate P defined on runs, let Pr[P] be the probability of the event {FeY: run(A, I, F) satisfies P}, for a fixed adversary A and initial configuration I.
The expected value of any complexity measure is defined as follows. Let T be a random variable that, for a given run, is the value of the complexity measure of interest for that run. For a fixed admissible adversary A and initial configuration I, let the expected value of T, taken over all F in ~, be denoted E(TA, I). Define the expected value for the protocol for a given value of t, E(T, t), to be maXA, I{E(TA, I) }, where A is any tadmissible adversary and I is any initial configuration.
Liveness condition
Given admissible run R and integer r, let DONE(R, r) be the predicate that every nonfaulty processor decides by its asynchronous round r in R. A protocol is t-nonblocking if for any t-admissible adversary A and any ini-
The t-nonblocking property means that the probability of all the nonfaulty processors having decided goes to 1 as the number of rounds increases without bound.
The randomized commit protocol
For all of this section we assume a fixed t > 0 with n > 2 t. Subsection 3.1 contains the code for our t-nonblocking transaction commit protocol, preceded by an informal description. In Subsect. 3.2 we prove that our protocol is a transaction commit protocol, i.e., it satisfies the safety conditions. In Subsect. 3.3 we prove an eventual termination property which is used in Subsect. 3.4 to show that our protocol is t-nonblocking. Subsection 3.5 contains the time analysis, in which we show that our protocol decides in a constant expected number of asynchronous rounds.
The protocol
In this subsection we present our randomized transaction commit protocol by describing, for each processor p, the states and transition function of p. We begin with an informal description.
Our protocol consists of a few preliminary message exchanges followed by a modification of the agreement protocol of Ben-Or [1] . The two purposes of the preliminary message exchanges are to resolve the differences between the input/output relations of the transaction commit and agreement problems (e.g., to ensure that if any vote is initially 0, then all the inputs to the agreement "subroutine" are 0) and for the coordinator to distribute n random bits to all the processors.
The original protocol of Ben-Or [1] proceeds in stages, with each processor using one random bit at each stage. The protocol is sure to terminate once a stage is reached in which each processor's random bit is equal to a particular value (chosen for that stage by the adversary). Obviously, if each processor's random bit in a stage is independent of every other processor's random bit for that stage, the expected number of stages until termination is exponential in the number of processors. In our protocol, the coordinator distributes n random bits to be used in the first n stages, one bit per stage. Thus all the processors will share the same random bit in each of the first n stages. The probability that none of the n common bits has the required value for its stage is exponentially small, causing the expected number of stages until termination to be constant.
We now describe the two parts of our protocol in more detail.
Throughout the protocol each processor keeps a vote indicating what it currently wants to do with the transaction. The processor with id 0 is the coordinator; at its first step, it chooses n random bits and distributes them to the other processors, the participants, by broadcasting a coins message containing the bits. (Throughout this paper we use "broadcast" to mean send to all processors.) If a participant receives no message at its first step (which only happens if the participant unilaterally initiates the protocol), it sends a request message to the coordinator (to try to jog it awake); if no reply is received within 2K steps, the participant sets its vote to 0 and decides 0. If a participant either receives a message at its first step or receives a timely reply to its request message, it extracts the n bits and broadcasts them in a coins message, to indicate that it is participating in the protocol. If all processors are nonfaulty and the run is on-time, then each processor receives a coins message from everyone within 2K steps after broadcasting one. If a processor does not receive these messages, it sets its vote to 0 and decides 0. In either event, each processor then broadcasts its vote. If a processor does not receive n votes for 1 within an additional 2K of its steps, it sets its vote to 0, but remains undecided. The rest of the protocol proceeds in stages (as in Ben-Or [1] ), numbered from 1 up without bound. In stage s, each processor p broadcasts its vote in a stage (s, 1) message and waits to receive n-t stage (s, 1) messages. If p receives at least n-t stage (s, 1) messages with the same value v~{0, 1), then p broadcasts v in a stage (s, 2) message; otherwise p broadcasts "?" in a stage (s, 2) message. The purpose of the first part of stage s is to ensure that it is never the case that some processor broadcasts 0 in a stage (s, 2) message and another processor broadcasts 1 in a stage (s, 2) message. In the second part of stage s, processor p waits to receive n-t stage (s, 2) messages. If p receives a stage (s, 2) message with value w{0, 1}, then p sets its vote to v; otherwise, p sets its vote to a random bit, either the #h random bit from the coins message if s_<n, or else a locally-determined random bit. If p receives at least n-t stage (s, 2) messages for value w{0, I}, then p decides v.
Processor p uses the following constants and variables. Constants, in addition to p itself, are n, t, and K as defined above. Variables are:
9 clockv: nonnegative integer; initially 0. 9 stagep: values are "asleep", "request", "coins", "vote", (s, 1) and (s, 2) for all s> 1; initially "asleep". 9 timerp: nonnegative integer or oo ; initially oo. 9 coinsp: n-bit string or nil; initially nil. 9 votep: boolean; initially p's initial value. 9 decider: boolean or nil; initially nil. 9 receivedp: set of raw messages; initially empty.
The text of each raw message consists of either a possible value for a stage v variable, or a triple containing a possible value for a stage v variable, an element of {0, 1, ?}, and an n-bit string.
Below we describe p's transition function, acting on state q of p, set M of raw messages, and n-bit string b. The state of p returned by the transition function is obtained from q in accordance with the following pseudocode. The set of raw messages returned by the transition function is that indicated by the send statements executed in the pseudocode. The statement "if expression then body elseif expression then body ... elseif expression then body endif" is a multiway branch. Proof First we show that each processor p broadcasts a vote message with value 1. Suppose either p is the coordinator or p receives a message at its first step. Then p broadcasts a coins message at its first step. By time K on p's clock, each processor receives p's coins message and broadcasts its own coins message (if it has not already done so). By time 2K on p's clock, p receives n coins messages. Thus p broadcasts a vote message with value 1. Now suppose p is not the coordinator and does not receive any messages at its first step. It sends a request message to the coordinator, which is received by time K on p's clock. The coordinator then broadcasts a coins message, if it has not already done so, and thus p receives some message containing the coins (not necessarily from the coordinator) at time TI<_2K on p's clock. Then p broadcasts a coins message at time T1; by time T 1 + K on p's clock, each processor receives p's coins message and broadcasts its own coins message (if it has not already done so) Proof Suppose p sets decidep to v in stage s. Then p receives at least n-t stage s S-messages for v. Let Sp be the set of processors that send stage s S-messages for v. Let q be any processor that completes stage s. Then q receives at least n-t stage (s, 2) messages. Since n > 2 t, at least one of these n-t messages received by q is from a processor in Sp. Since no processor broadcasts conflicting messages, q receives at least one stage s S-message for v. By Lemma 4, q receives no stage s 
Case 3a. If r=s, then p receives at least n-t stage r S-messages for v and q receives at least n-t stage r S-messages for w. By Lemma 4, v = w. Proof By Lemma 7 and inspection, Protocol 1 is actually a protocol, according to our definition. It remains to show that it is a transaction commit protocol.
Let R be a t-admissible run. The agreement condition is satisfied by Lemma 6.
Next we show the abort validity condition. Suppose some processor begins with initial value 0. By the code, any processor that decides before completing stage 0 decides 0. By Lemma 1 and part 3 of Lemlna 3, any processor that completes stage 1 and has not already decided, decides 0 at the end of stage 1.
Finally, we show the commit validity condition. Suppose R is failure-free and on-time, and all processors begin with 1. Then every processor completes stage 1. By Lemma 2 and part 3 of Lemma 3, every processor decides 1 at the end of stage 1. [] By our definition of transaction commit protocol, the agreement, abort validity, and commit validity conditions are true even for runs in which more than t processors fail. This is the graceful degradation property exhibited by our protocol.
Eventual termination
The analysis in this subsection shows that the probability that all processors that complete stage s, decide by stage s, approaches 1 as s approaches infinity. Recall that probabilities are taken over the random information (i.e., the sample space is ~), holding the adversary and initial configuration fixed.
For the following definitions, fix adversary A, initial configuration/, and F and F' in ~. Let 
R=run(A, I, F) and R'= run(A, I, F').
Define F(p, k) to be the k th element in the sequence for p in F. Define coins(F) to be F(0, 1) (i.e., the coordinator's first n-bit string). It is easy to see that if coinsv is ever nonnil in R, then it equals coins(F), for all p. We denote the s th element of coins(F) by coins(F) [ 
random(R, p, s)=random(R', p, s). Note that for a fixed
A, I, and s, (A, I, s)-equality is an equivalence relation on Y.
In the following three definitions, s _> 1.
Define v(R, s) to be the value of a stage s S-message sent in run R. If no stage s S-message is sent in R, then let v(R, s)=0. By Lemma 4, v(R, s) is well-defined. Define MATCH(R, S) to be the predicate that if s_<n, then eoins(F)[s]=v(R,s), and if s>n, then random(R, p, s)=v(R, s) for all p.
Define DEC~DE(R, S) to be the predicate that each processor that completes stage s has decided by the end of stage s (or earlier) in R.
The next lemma characterizes two aspects of runs that are unchanged once an adversary and initial configuration are fixed. 
Lemma 9. Let A be an adversary, I an initial configuration, and F and F' e~. Let R =run(A, I, F)=C1 el C2 ... and R'=run(A, I, F')=C'I e'l

Proof. (Part 1).
The structure of the protocol is such that the random information does not affect which processors send messages to which other processor it only affects the values of the local variables and the message contents. But this is the very information not available to the adversaries under consideration. Thus, for a fixed adversary and initial configuration, the sequence of processor steps and the message delays are the same, regardless of the random information.
(
Part 2). This follows from part 1 of this lemma. []
The next lemma states that the value of a stage s + 1 S-message only depends on the random information available through stage s, once an adversary and initial configuration are fixed.
Lemma 10. Let R=run(A, I, F) and R'=run(A, I, F') for adversary A, initial configuration I, and F and F' in ~. If F and F' are (A,I,s)-equal, then v(R,s+l)= v(R', s + l), for any s>O.
Proof. By Lemma 9, the message patterns for R and R' are the same. Since F and F' are (A, I, s)-equal, the random information that affects the local variables and message contents in R and R' up through stage s is the same in F and F'. Thus, the values of corresponding processors' variables, and the contents of corresponding messages sent up through stage s are the same in R and R'. The random information used in a processor's stage s+ 1 is not used until the end of that stage, so the same messages are sent in each processor's stage s+ 1 in R and R', even though the stage s+ 1 random information might be different in F and F'. [2] The next lemma states a simple relationship between MATCH and DECIDE. Lemma 
Let R=run(A, I, F) for adversary A, initial configuration I, and Fe~. For all s> 1, MATCH(R, S) implies DECIDE(R, S + 1).
Proof. Fix (run(A, l, F The next lemma is the key to the termination of the protocol, as well as the good time performance. It says that there is a high probability that the random information used to set votes matches the value in S-messages for the first n stages, and there is a smaller, but still positive probability for subsequent stages. The next lemma provides a means of calculating the probability of certain compound events. These probabilities will be used in the proofs of Lemmas 15 and 19. 
), i)=MATCH(run(A, I, F'), i) for all i, 1 <_ i <<_ s, and any F and F' in C. (2) If s<n, then Pr[MATCH(run(A, I, F), s+ I)[FeC]
=run(A, I, F) and R'=run(A, I, U). Since F and F' are (A, I,/-U-equal, v(R, i)=v(R', i), by Lemma 10. Since F and F' are (A, I,i)-equal, coins(F)[i] =coins(F')[i] if inn, and random(R, p, i)=random(R', p, i) for all p if/> n; thus MATCH(R, i)= MATCH(R', i). (Part 2). By Lemma 10, v(run(A, I, F), s+ 1) is the same for all FeC. Call this value v. Suppose s <n. For F in C, MATCH(run(A, I, F), s+ 1) is true if and only if coins(F)[s+l]=v. Recall that coins(F)[s+l] is equal to either 0 or 1. Pr[coins(F)
[
Lemma 14. Fix adversary A, initial configuration I, and s> l. Let R=run(A, I, F) for Fe~ and for all i, l <i<s, let M~ be either MATCH(R, i) or ~ MATCH(R, i). Then
Liveness condition
Lemma 15 in the last subsection showed that our protocol terminates in a bounded expected number of stages. Let p be any processor that broadcasts a stage (s + 1, 2) message. Processor p cannot finish round r + 1 until it has received the last of the round r messages, including all the stage (s+ 1, 1) messages. Immediately after receiving the last of these (if not before), p broadcasts its stage (s + 1, 2) message, so all stage (s + 1, 2) messages are at most round r + 1 messages.
No processor p can finish round r+2 until it has received the last of the round r+ 1 messages, including all the stage (s + 1, 2) messages. Yet by the time p receives 97 all the stage (s+ 1, 2) messages, p has completed stage s+l.
[]
Theorem 18. Protocol 1 is t-nonblocking.
Proof Pick any t-admissible run R. There are two cases. Case 1. All nonfaulty processors complete stage 0 in R. Since R is t-admissible, at most t processors fail in R, and thus every nonfaulty processor completes stage s, for all s _> 0. By Lemmas 16 and 17, DECIDE(R, S) implies DONE(R, 6 + 2S). Lemma 15 gives the result.
Case 2. Some nonfaulty processor p does not complete stage 0 in R. By the code, p is stuck in its request stage. (If a processor ever enters its coins stage, then by 2K steps later it enters its vote stage and after at most another 2K steps it completes stage 0.) Thus p times out in its request stage after 2K steps, which is at most two rounds, and decides 0. Note that p never sends a coins message.
Let q be any nonfaulty processor. If q does not complete stage 0, then the argument in the previous paragraph shows that q decides in at most two rounds. Suppose q does complete stage 0. Since p never sends a coins message, q never receives n coins messages, and thus q times out after at most 4K steps, which is at most four rounds, and decides 0. []
Time complexity
First we show that the expected number of stages of Protocol 1 is less than 4. Then we show that the expected number of rounds is constant. Recall that expectation of complexity measures is defined at the end of Subsect. 2.4.
Lemma 19. Let X be a random variable giving the least s such that DECIDE(R, S) is true. Then E(X, t)<4.
Proof Fix t-admissible adversary A and initial configuration I. Let R=run(A, I, F) , for F in Y. Let qs = Pr [-7 MATCH (R, s)]. Let Y be a random variable giving the least s such that MATCH(R, S) is true. By Lemma 11, X<Y+I. s=l i i s=n+l \i=n+l / We simplify using specific values for qi. For 1 < inn, qi= 1/2, and for i>n, qi= 1 -1/2", by Lemma 13. The proof of the previous theorem shows that every nonfaulty processor decides the fate of the transaction in 14 expected rounds. Recall that expectation is defined with respect to the worst possible adversary, that is, the worst possible scheduling of processor steps and message delays. When the system is well-behaved, our protocol has better performance. In particular, if the coordinator initiates the protocol, the system is synchronous, and there are no late messages or failures, then all the processors decide in 5 K steps, using 4 n 2 messages.
E(X, t)<<_ 1 + E(Y, t)
=1+ ~ Pr[Y>s],
Lower bound on number of processors
The lower bounds proved in the next two sections hold even if processors run in lockstep synchrony and possess an atomic broadcast capability. In this section, we first give relevant details of this stronger model, and then show that the number of faults tolerated by our transaction commit protocol is optimal.
A processor failure is represented by an explicit failure step, denoted (p, L, b). After a failure step for p, p is in a distinguished failed state. Thus failures can be evidenced in finite runs. (Of course, processors cannot detect failures because message delivery is asynchronous.) A processor is faulty in a run if it takes a failure step, otherwise it is nonfaulty.
Processors take steps in round-robin order, 0 through n-1 ; a schedule of the form (0, M1, fl)... (n-1, Mn, fn) is a cycle. To enforce the round-robin behavior, each configuration has a turn component, designating which processor's turn it is to take a step. An initial configuration has turn=O. In order for an event e=(p, *, b) to be applicable to a configuration C, turn(C) must equal p, and if p is in the failed state in C, then e must be a failure step. After an event is applied, the resulting configuration's turn component is incremented by 1 (modulo n).
The notion of a guaranteed message is no longer needed, since atomic broadcast is allowed.
From event e = (p, M, b) applied to configuration C, we compute the delay of message m in M (differently from before) as the number of the cycle in which the message is received minus the number of the cycle in which the message is sent. The number of the receiving cycle is obtained from C by looking at the clock v component of p's state. The number of the sending cycle is obtained from m, which consists of the "sending time" integer tagged onto the raw message; the sending time is the value of the sender's clock variable when m is sent, i.e., the sending cycle number.
An infinite run R is admissible if the first configuration is an initial configuration, all messages sent to a nonfaulty processor are received, and all received messages have delay at least 1. In this model, the adversary cannot schedule when processors take steps, but can only schedule when a processor fails and select the message delays.
In this section we show that no protocol, even a randomized one, can solve the transaction commit problem unless more than half the processors are nonfaulty. The intuition behind the proof is similar to that for the coordinated attack problem (first posed by Gray [9] ; also analyzed by Halpern and Moses [10] ). We partition the processors into two nonempty groups, each of size at most t. Given a run that decides 1 (in which all processors begin with 1), we work backwards from the end of the run to the beginning, delaying messages between the two groups and showing that the resulting runs must still decide 1. Eventually we get a run in which no messages between the groups are received, yet the processors decide 1. This situation leads to a contradiction, since one group could have started with 0's, in which case the decision should be 0.
The actual construction of the runs is fairly involved, and is facilitated by the following definitions and lemmas.
Let state(p, C) be the state of processor p in configuration C, and buff(p, C) be the state of p's buffer in C. Lemma 21. Let 6 be a schedule applicable to configuration C and z be a schedule applicable to configuration D. Let 
S be a set of processors. If state(p, C)=state(p, D) for all processors p in S and if ~[ S = z l S, then for any processor p in S, state(p, a(C))= state(p, z(O)).
Proof. Use induction on the length of a IS, and the fact that the transition functions are deterministic, given states, messages, and random numbers. [] Given a partition of the set of processors P into two sets S and S', define an intergroup message (relative to S and S') to be a message sent from a processor in S to a processor in S' or vice versa. Claim. There exist y+ 1 finite failure-free schedules 51 through ey+l such that for each i, (1) ei=nl ...hi-1 7i, (2) cq is applicable to I 11, (3) all processors have decided 1 in ~i(111), and (4) no intergroup message is received in 7i.
Lemma 22. Let S and S' be a partition of the set of processors, and let C and D be two configurations such that turn(C)=turn(D), and for all p in S, state(p, C)= state(p, D) and buff(p, C)c_buff (p, D). Let a be a schedule applicable to C in which any intergroup message that is received by p~S in 6 is in buff(p, C). Then
Proof of Claim. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the proof. Induction. i<y+ 1. We assume the claim is true for i + 1 and show it for i.
Assume ni is a B-semicycle, i.e., i is even. (We will indicate in parentheses the changes, other than switching "A" and "B', that are necessary when n~ is an A-semicycle, i.e., when i is odd.)
We construct 7~ in two steps; first we construct ill, after which all processors in A have decided, and then we construct //2, in which all processors in B decide. //11A = rci ~ 1l A, Lemma 21 applies and each processor in A has the same state in //I(C~_I)=F as it does in (~i 7i+1) (Ci-1), so each decides 1 in F. No intergroup message is received in//1 because processors in B receive no messages in//1, and processors in A receive no intergroup messages in Tc i ~i+ 1 or in//1. Now we must give a schedule//2 that causes processors in B to decide 1 without hearing from any processors in A. (See Fig. 2 .) The intuition is that processors in B must be able to decide without hearing from processors in A, because it is possible that all the processors in A have died. By the agreement condition, the processors in B must decide 1 also. The problem with applying this argument is that there may be leftover messages sent by processors in A before the point at which the processors in B think they died, and thus processors in B could wait to receive these messages before deciding. Thus, we must show that processors in A might have died even earlier.
Semicycle One might imagine a transaction commit protocol for our model such that each processor could decide in a constant number of its own steps, at least in many runs. For instance, in the protocol presented in Sect. 3, at most 6K steps are required for a processor to complete stage 0 -a processor need not wait arbitrarily long for messages since the existence of a late message means that the processor is allowed to abort. Yet in the subsequent stages, no advantage is taken of this flexibility, and processors wait potentially unbounded time for messages. Unfortunately, the intuition that it may be possible to use the detection of late messages in order to shorten the running time (as measured in processor steps) is incorrect. In fact, in this section we prove that no protocol can guarantee that each processor terminates in a constant expected number of its own steps, even if processors run in lockstep synchrony, and even if only one processor can fail.
In particular, we show that for any constant B and any fixed protocol, there is a 1-admissible adversary and an initial configuration such that the expected number of cycles needed for all nonfaulty processors to decide is more than B. The proof is constructed as follows. We consider the initial configuration in which all processors begin with 1 and the adversary that kills no processors and delivers all messages with delay 1. If no run from this initial configuration with this adversary is deciding by cycle B, we are done. Suppose there is such a B-cycle run that is deciding. We find a point in this run that has the property there are some very long runs (with a different adversary) extending from this point that are not deciding. These runs are kept undeciding by delaying the delivery of all messages; they are so long that they cause the expected value to exceed B, when calculated with the appropriate initial configuration and adversary.
Thus, we must solve two subproblems. First, we must find the appropriate point in the run from which the long runs branch off (cf. Lemma 24); second, we must show that the long runs extending from this point are undeciding (cf. Lemma 25).
We need the following definitions in addition to the definitions and Lemmas 21 and 22 from Sect. 4.
For the remainder of this section, we fix an arbitrary 1-nonblocking transaction commit protocol P. From now on, "run" means a 1-admissible run of P, and "configuration" means a configuration reachable from some initial configuration of P by a 1-admissible run of P.
If p is a processor, then schedule a is p-free if p only takes failure steps in a.
A run is x-slow for some constant x if every message received in the run has delay at least x. Given a configuration C, a schedule a is x-slow relative to C if the run obtained by applying a to C is x-slow.
A seed (for protocol P) is an n-tuple of sequences of n-bit strings, such that either each sequence is infinite or each sequence has the same number of elements. The The next lemma shows that in any F-compatible run that decides 1, there exists a configuration from which some F-compatible, x-slow run decides 1, and from which some other F-compatible, x-slow run decides 0. Fig. 3 ; in the figure a v in a box below a configuration means that the configuration is (x, F, {v})-valent.) By the commit validity condition, ~(I1)= C has decision value 1. Thus all runs starting at C, including x-slow F-compatible runs, have decision value 1, and hence C is (x, F, {1})-valent.
Let Iol be the initial configuration in which some processor q has initial value 0 and the rest have initial value 1. Since the protocol is 1-nonblocking and satisfies the abort validity condition and since F is finite, there is a finite q-free x-slow F-compatible run run(Io 1, a) such that a(Iol ) has decision value 0, and by the agreement condition, ~r(I01 ) is (x, F, {0})-valent.
By part 1 of Lemma 22, a is also applicable to 11. By Lemma 21, all processors except q have the same state in a(Ii) as in a(Io0, and decide 0 in a(I1). Thus 11 is either (x, F, {0})-valent or (x, F, {0, 1})-valent. If the latter is true, we are done, since 11 is the desired configuration. Suppose the former is true.
Since We will associate each seed in 5 ~ with a configuration in ~. For each configuration in cg, we will associate a specific adversary. The associations will be made in such a way that all runs from a configuration in c~, using its particular adversary and any of the associated seeds, is undeciding. The desired adversary is the adversary for that configuration with the most seeds. The extreme length of these undeciding runs will cause the desired expected value to exceed B for this adversary. Let l be the number of events that precede C in run R. Let A be the adversary that for the first l events delivers messages after delay 1 and that subsequently delivers messages after delayjmB. By Lemma 25, for every F in S(C), the final configuration of run(A, It, F) is (~roB, F, {0, 1})-valent. Thus, no processor has decided in that final configuration, and T(R')>jmB, for any infinite run R' that is an extension of run(A, I1, F). T(run(A, I, F) )>jmB, by the argument above. As a result,
E(T~,;)>-~m'jmB=B. []
Summary
In summary, the principal contributions of this paper are a realistic timing model, a method for analyzing the time performance of protocols in this model, an efficient fault-tolerant protocol for the transaction commit problem, and lower bounds showing that the protocol has optimal fault-tolerance, and that no protocol can guarantee that each processor terminates in a bounded expected number of its own steps, even if processors run in lockstep synchrony and only one processor can fail.
